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I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973 
with overwhelming bipartisan support and remarkably little fan-
fare.1 Everyone agreed that the two previous federal efforts to solve 
                                               
 * John N. Matthews Professor, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful for the op-
portunity to present this article in the 2017 Idaho Law Review Annual Symposium on Live-
stock Grazing on Public Lands:  Law, Policy & Rebellion, sponsored by the U.S. Bureau of 
Land Management and held in Boise on March 31, 2017. 
 1. See Shannon Petersen, Congress and Charismatic Megafauna: A Legislative His-
tory of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL. L. 464, 483 (1999) (reporting that “most people 
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the problem were inadequate, even though they had just been en-
acted in 1966 and 1969. 2  There were only two questions that 
needed to be answered: what to do about endangered plants, and 
what to do about states.3 Plants proved to be not much of a prob-
lem,4 but the role of states remains unsettled and contested today.5 
Historically, states were responsible for the wildlife within 
their borders.6 The enactment of the ESA changed that.7 Now more 
than 1,200 animals are protected by federal law,8 and their protec-
tion has displaced state management regimes. The ESA has come 
to rely on federal authority to an even greater extent than contem-
porary federal environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act 
and the Clean Water Act, which are often heralded as models of 
cooperative federalism.9 
And that has provoked a push back. Many states, especially 
western states, object to the federal control that the ESA exerts 
over them. That control takes two basic forms: regulation of wild-
life and regulation of land use.Wolves are an example of federal 
regulation of wildlife that is opposed by many states. 10  Idaho 
                                               
in and outside of Congress thought the Act was relatively insignificant” and that “the press 
barely even mentioned the ESA’s enactment”).  
 2. Id. at 473. 
 3. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, AS AMENDED IN 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, AND 1980 145 
(1982) [hereinafter ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].  
 4. See id. at 147–48 (describing the concerns about endangered plants).  
 5. See generally  Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Protecting Endangered Species without Reg-
ulating Private Landowners: The Case of Endangered Plants, CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
PUBLIC POLICY (1998), http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol8/iss1/1. 
 6. See generally Esa Legislative History. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Endangered Species Act by the Numbers, NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, 
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/box-score-report (last visited May 3, 2017). 
 9. See infra note 119. 
 10. See IDAHO LEGISLATIVE WOLF OVERSIGHT COMM., IDAHO WOLF CONSERVATION 
AND MGMT. PLAN (Mar. 2002).  
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doesn't want too many wolves, but the United States does.11 Most 
ESA disputes, though, involve state complaints about federal land 
use regulation. Idaho is happy to share its land with the sage 
grouse, so long as the sage grouse does not interfere with how the 
locals want to use the land.12 
The ESA has long been subject to contrasting perceptions as a 
remarkable success, a dismal failure, or something between. 13 
Many westerners believe that the law needs to be improved. It “is 
like a 40- year-old ranch pickup: it once served a useful purpose, 
but it is in bad need of repair.”14 The only question for them is 
whether the ESA needs to be revised, or instead to be repealed and 
replaced.15 
                                               
 11. Id. 
 12. See Executive Dep’t of the State of Idaho, Exec. Order No. 2012-02, Establishing 
the Governor’s Sage-Grouse Task Force (Mar. 9, 2012), https://fishandgame.idaho.gov/pub-
lic/wildlife/SGtaskForce/execOrder.pdf. 
 13 Compare Briefing on Improving the Endangered Species Act: Perspectives from 
the Fish and Wildlife Service and State Governors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, 
Water, and Wildlife of the H. Comm. on Env. and Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 6–7 (2015) [herein-
after Briefing on Improving the ESA] (statement of Dan Ashe, Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Service) (characterizing the ESA as “among the Nation’s and the world’s most aspirational, 
important, and successful environmental laws”) with id. at 36 (statement of Wyoming Gover-
nor Mead) (insisting that “the ESA is broken”). See generally John Copeland Nagle, The Effec-
tiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203 (2009) (analyzing the conflicting 
claims from the perspective of the ESA’s stated purposes).  
 14 Briefing on Improving the ESA, supra note 1313, at 3 (statement of Sen. Steve 
Daines);  see also Briefing on Improving the ESA, supra note 1313, at 4–6 (statement of Sen. 
Sullivan) (observing that the ESA “hasn’t been modernized or comprehensively updated since 
1988,” which “is a long time for a statute of this importance”).   
 15. Compare H.R. 4315, “21st Century Endangered Species Transparency Act”; H.R. 
4316, “Endangered Species Recovery Transparency Act”; H.R. 4317, “State, Tribal, and Local 
Species Transparency and Recovery Act”; and H.R. 4318, “Endangered Species Litigation Rea-
sonableness Act”: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) 
(statement of Rep. Hastings of Washington) (advising that “it has never been my intent to 
introduce a sweeping overhaul of the Endangered Species Act. I don’t believe that is the best 
way to go forward. Instead, the focus needs to be on thoughtful, sensible, and targeted pro-
posals”) with Corbin Hiar, Endangered Species:  Rep. Bishop aims to repeal landmark conser-
vation law, E&E DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060046928 (quot-
ing Representative Bishop’s statement that “I’m not sure if there’s a way of actually reforming 
the Endangered Species Act or if you simply have to start over again,” and adding that “Repeal 
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This article argues that we simply need to recover the original 
vision of the state role in the ESA. The Congress that enacted the 
ESA in 1973 expected that states would play a lead in conservation 
efforts because the states already had substantially more wildlife 
management expertise than the federal government. The federal 
role, as the Department of the Interior testified at the time, was 
“an overseeing operation” to ensure that states were fulfilling the 
purposes of the law.16 Perhaps more than anything else, the Con-
gress that enacted the ESA sought to avoid jurisdictional in-
fighting17 – but that is precisely what has happened in too many 
instances. 
A revived state role has numerous advantages.  Cooperative 
federalism is the norm in federal environmental statutes, and it is 
conspicuous by its absence in the ESA State environmental regu-
lation, which has become quite attractive to many environmental-
ists at the onset of the Trump Administration. The Western Gov-
ernors Association (WGA) has prioritized reforming the ESA in or-
der to better achieve the statute’s goals while better respecting 
state authorities and interests.  The theoretical justification has 
been there all along. The doctrine of subsidiarity, which emerged 
from Catholic social thought and now plays a key role in the gov-
ernance of the European Union, seeks to empower local and state 
authorities but is willing to rely on federal power if the states prove 
to be inadequate.18 This Article thus proposes to return to the orig-
                                               
it and replace it” is his preferred approach); see also Press Release, Center for Biological Di-
versity, Rep. Bishop’s True Intentions Revealed: Invalidate Endangered Species Act (Dec. 8, 
2016), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2016/rob-bishop-12-08-
2016.html (accusing Representative Bishop of wanting “to get rid of the Act completely”). 
 16. Endangered Species: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife 
Conservation and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93rd 
Cong. 211 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House ESA Hearing] (statement of Nathaniel Reed, Assis-
tant Secretery for Fish and Wildlief and Parks, Department of the Interior) (expressing the 
hope that “each of the States will pass a program which will be acceptable to us, and our job 
will be looking over their shoulder.  It will be a very friendly look over the shoulder . . . .”).  
 17. Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environment 
of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 93rd Cong. 75 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Senate ESA Hearings] 
(statement of Sen. Ted Stevens) (stating that “I don’t want to get into the position where we 
are getting in to such a cloudy relationship between the State fish and game people and [the 
federal officials] that we will be in a constant battle”).  
 18. See infra note 121.  
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inal understanding of the state role in the ESA by further empow-
ering state conservation efforts to avoid ESA listings, by resurrect-
ing the cooperative agreements that Congress expected to play a 
major role in the implementation of the act, and by promoting ad-
ditional funding and assistance to state wildlife managers who are 
seeking to achieve the goals of the ESA. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE STATE ROLE IN THE ESA 
A. Before 1973 
Concerns about extinction are relatively recent. Thomas Jef-
ferson, attuned to the scientific advances of his age, nonetheless 
believed that it was impossible for any type of animal to go ex-
tinct.19 Indeed, one of Jefferson’s reasons for supporting the Lewis 
and Clark Expedition was to discover where the mastodons and 
other prehistoric animals still roamed the Earth.20 The reality of 
extinction took hold as passenger pigeons, the heath hen, etc., dis-
appeared by the beginning of the twentieth century, and buffalo 
almost joined them.21 Several states tried to save those animals, 
but their efforts were too little and too late.22 
States retained their traditional authority over wildlife 
throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. As 
the Supreme Court explained in 1896, states have the “undoubted 
authority to control the taking and use of that which belonged to 
no one in particular but was common to all.”23 Of course, prior to 
the New Deal, states were viewed as sovereign over many other 
                                               
 19. See THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON VIRGINIA (1783), reprinted in THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: 1781-1784 144  (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1783) (stating that “[s]uch is 
the oeconomy of nature, that no instance can be produced of her having permitted any one race 
of her animals to become extinct; of her having formed any link in her great work so weak as 
to be broken”).  
 20. See MARK V. BARROW, JR., NATURE’S GHOSTS: CONFRONTING EXTINCTION FROM 
THE AGE OF JEFFERSON TO THE AGE OF ECOLOGY (2009).  
 21. See generally CHRISTOPHER COKINOS, HOPE IS THE THING WITH FEATHERS: A 
PERSONAL CHRONICAL OF VANISHED BIRDS (2009) (telling the story of the disappearance of the 
Carolina parakeet, the ivory-billed woodpecker, the heath hen, the passenger pigeon, the la-
borador duck, and the great auk). 
 22. See id. (recounting unsuccessful conservation efforts).  
 23. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896).  
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areas which we have now become accustomed to view as federal 
issues. But the state control over wildlife, like the state control over 
land use, endured far longer and continues to endure today. Those 
state actions included efforts to prevent species within their bor-
ders from going extinct.24 
Federal wildlife protection was episodic. In 1874, Congress 
passed a bill that would have banned the killing of buffalo in fed-
eral territories, but President Grant pocket-vetoed it.25 The Lacey 
Act of 1900 was the first general federal wildlife law, but even it 
relied on state law to determine which interstate commerce in an-
imals was prohibited.26 The most significant federal wildlife man-
agement occurred on federal lands, including prohibitions on hunt-
ing in national parks and the establishment of national wildlife 
refuges.27 
An increasing concern about the environment and the in-
creased expansion of federal power combined to produce the En-
dangered Species Preservation Act of 1966.28 That statute called 
for a list of endangered species, it directed federal agencies to pro-
tect threatened species “where practicable,” it created and author-
ized funding for the National Wildlife Refuge System, and it pro-
hibited the “taking” of species within a refuge.29 The 1966 law did 
not, however, regulate private actions that threatened a species 
outside national wildlife refuge, and it not apply at all endangered 
invertebrates, plants, or subspecies.30 Three years later, Congress 
                                               
 24. See 1973 Senate ESA Hearing, supra note 17, at 111 (testimony of Dr. Laurence 
R. Jahn, President, Wildlife Management Institute) (stating “that the history of American 
wildlife restoration has been one of rescuing many species from extinction” and that state 
agencies “have been involved in such work from the very beginning”).  
 25. See 43 Cong. Rec. H2106–08 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1874); Petersen, supra note 1, at 
468. 
 26. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 3372 (2012).  
 27. See Petersen, supra note 1, at 467–71 (describing federal efforts to manage wild-
life prior to the ESA).  
 28. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed 1973). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
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expanded protections by enacting the Endangered Species Conser-
vation Act of 1969.31 The new law banned the importation of any-
thing made from a species endangered elsewhere in the world, in-
cluded invertebrates, and called for an international convention to 
prevent extinctions.32 
B. 1973 
1. The legislative history of the 1973 ESA 
President Nixon declared the 1969 law inadequate almost as 
soon as it was passed.33 Congress held multiple hearings before it 
passed the law that became the ESA in 1973.34 As noted above, the 
proper role of the states was the dominant concern during those 
discussions.35 
Generally, and surprisingly from a twenty-first century per-
spective, the authors of the ESA agreed that states were far better 
equipped to manage wildlife than the federal government.36 Most 
states had much more developed wildlife programs. Collectively, 
the states had orders of magnitude more enforcement agents than 
                                               
 31. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973).  
 32. See Petersen, supra note 1, at 471–72 (summarizing the 1966 and 1969 acts); 
George Cameron Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 51 ND L. REV. 315, 317–18 (1975) (same).  
 33. See Richard Nixon, Statement on Transmitting a Special Message to the Congress 
Outlining the 1972 Environmental Program, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Feb. 8, 
1972), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3731 (asserting that “even the most recent act 
to protect endangered species, which dates only from 1969, simply does not provide the kind 
of management tools need to act early enough to save a vanishing species”).  
 34. See generally ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3. 
 35. Id.  
 36. See id. at 146 (concluding that “the states are far better equipped to handle the 
problems of day-to-day management and enforcement of laws and regulations for the protec-
tion of endangered species than is the Federal government”); id. at 199–200 (advising that “the 
greater bulk of the enforcement capability concerning endangered species lies in the hands of 
the State fish and game agencies, not the Federal Government”). 
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the federal government.37 As one person put it, the federal govern-
ment was “dreadfully undermanned.”38 The authors of the ESA 
thus repeatedly emphasized that they were not displacing state bi-
ological expertise.39 A U.S. Department official promised Congress 
that “the Federal Government recognizes that it has neither the 
inclination nor the wherewithal to accomplish endangered species 
management programs in every one of the 50 states.”40 
Numerous states boasted about their wildlife programs. A 
Minnesota official described how his state “had a real sincere con-
cern for the timber wolf at that time when the wolf was still con-
sidered as a varmint species.”41 Alaska Governor William Egan 
proclaimed that his state “has done more over a long period of time 
to adequately protect and management our wildlife resources than 
any of the other 50 states.”42  New York’s Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral asked Congress to ensure that the state could continue to en-
force its Mason Act, which provided broader protections than the 
proposed  
ESA.43 
At the same time, Congress believed that states alone were 
inadequate. Congress was aware that not all states are equally 
                                               
 37. See id. at 369 (reporting that the State of Michigan had 200 full-time and 200 
part-time conservation employees while there were only two federal enforcement officials in 
Michigan); 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 52 (statement of Sen. Stevens) (as-
serting that Alaska has “more than 20 times the number of State enforcement officers than 
Federal officers”).  
 38. 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 130 (testimony of Cynthia Wilson, 
Washington Representative, National Audubon Soc’y). 
 39. Id. at 65 (testimony of E.U. Curtis Bohlen, Deputy Ass’t Sec’y of the Interior for 
Fish, Wildlife, and Parks).  
 40. Id. at 53 (testimony of Douglas P. Wheeler, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Fish, Wild-
life, and Parks). Accord 1973 House ESA Hearing, supra note 16, at 242 (insisting that “[t]he 
Federal Government cannot successfully carry out wildlife conservation programs extending 
into every nook and cranny of the United States”).  
 41. 1973 House ESA Hearing, supra note 16, at 321 (testimony of Mike Casey, Direc-
tor, Minnesota Dep’t of Natural Resources).  
 42. 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 150 (letter from Gov. Egan).  
 43. See 1973 House ESA hearing, supra note 16, at 351–62 (testimony of New York 
Assistant Attorney General James P. Corcoran).  
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competent with respect to their wildlife management programs.44 
One environmental official asserted that “at least one-third of the 
State agencies have become commercial bureaucracies solely inter-
ested in selling hunting licenses.”45  There were mixed opinions 
about whether states would embrace, resist, or accept the act.46 
Federal authority was needed to resist local political pressures.47 
A federal role was also necessary because of wildlife that crosses 
state or international lines.48 Finally, there was a national interest 
in preventing extinction, which called for a national policy to pro-
tect endangered species.49 A federal floor for protection was neces-
sary.50 
Much of the congressional debate sought to strike the right 
balance between federal and state management. Some wanted 
states to be “treated as equal partners.”51 The supporters of the 
                                               
 44. 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 132 (testimony of Mr. Kaufmann) 
(observing that “[s]ome States have been doing a fine job, while some States have been doing 
a poor one,” while there is “a whole spectrum in between”).   
 45. 1973 House ESA Hearing, supra note 16, at 302 (testimony of Tom Garrett, Wild-
life Director, Friends of the Earth).  Taken aback, Representative Breaux responded, “That is 
a very strong statement.”  Id. (statement of Rep. Breaux) 
 46. Compare id. at 211 (testimony of Assistant Secretary Reed) (stating “I am very 
optimistic that the 50 states are going to very swiftly . . . pass laws giving them the authority 
they need”) with id. at 327 (testimony of Mike Casey) (surmising that “perhaps each individual 
State will probably have its problems convincing people or selling people on some of their pro-
grams because certainly people look differently on these things, unfortunately”).  
 47. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 359 (justifying federal authority 
as necessary “to insure that local political pressures do not lead to the destruction of a vital 
national asset”).  
 48. See 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 130 (testimony of Robert 
Hughes, Sierra Club Nat’l Comm.); 1973 House ESA Hearing, supra note 16, at 205 (testimony 
of Nathaniel P. Reed, Ass’t Sec’y of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks).  
 49. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 194; 1973 House ESA Hearing, 
supra note 24, at 248 (testimony of Cynthia E. Wilson, Washington Representative, National 
Audubon Soc’y) (describing “the nationwide interest in endangered species.  No matter where 
a particular endangered species resides, its fate is of concern to citizens all around the coun-
try”).  
 50. ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 194. 
 51. 1973 House ESA Hearing, supra note 24, at 380 (letter from Alaska Dep’t of Fish 
& Game Commissioner James W. Brooks to Sen. Gravel, Apr. 17, 1973).  
394 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
proposed legislation insisted that they did not intend to usurp state 
management authority.52 The recent experience with the Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, which preempted state law, explained 
why the ESA “provides for a larger role for the States and why 
there has been less opposition to it.”53 Numerous supporters agreed 
that states would be allowed to regulate their wildlife more strin-
gently than the federal government if they chose to do so.54 Yet 
state authority was limited. The federal government could regulate 
endangered species even though wildlife management was “an 
area heretofore reserved by the States.”55 The idea was “to alert all 
states to a matter of public concern and to give them an oppor-
tunity to respond if they have not already done so.”56 
The solution was to have the federal government oversee the 
state wildlife management programs to ensure that they satisfied 
the national standards and goals. The federal role was essential. 
But states were then expected to play a leading role in implement-
ing the law.57 The ESA would rely on existing state programs to 
manage wildlife in a manner that prevented extinction 58  Thus 
states that already possessed adequate programs would not be af-
fected by the ESA.59 
That general understanding of the federal-state relationship 
yielded three specific policies. First, the federal government would 
                                               
 52. Id. at 205, 211 (testimony of Ass’t Sec’y Reed); see also id. at 377 (letter from 
Seymour H. Levy, President, Tucson Wildlife Unlimited, Inc., to Rep. Dingell, Mar. 7, 1973) 
(decrying the proposed legislation as “thinly veiled attempts by the Federal Government to 
continue in its seemingly never ending usurpation of states’ authority over resident wildlife 
species”).  
 53. ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 369 (statement of Sen. Stevens).  
 54. See id. at 2, 146, 194, 199. 
 55. 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 52 (testimony of Deputy Ass’t Sec’y 
Wheeler).  
 56. Id. at 110 (statement of Dr. Laurence R. Jahn, President, Wildlife Management 
Institute).  
 57. ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 200. 
 58. Id. at 303. 
 59. 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17, at 57. 
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possess the authority to decide whether or not to list a species un-
der the act.60 To be sure, some state officials had opposed allowing 
the federal government to list species “without the concurrence of 
the affected States,” characterizing such an arrangement as “an 
infringement on State’s rights to properly manage and protect res-
ident wildlife species.”61 But the supporters of the law were em-
phatic that states would not possess a veto over listing decisions.62 
Then, once a species was listed, the federal government would 
enter a cooperative agreement with the state for the management 
of the species.63 As the House committee report explained, “[t]he 
subject of cooperative agreements was discussed extensively 
within the Committee and with other knowledgeable people.”64 The 
director of the National Wildlife Refuge testified “that cooperative 
joint Federal-States efforts are needed to insure the most effective 
effort to manage endangered species.”65 The result would be that 
the law would begin by giving authority to the federal government, 
then the federal government could delegate that authority back to 
any states that wanted to manage the program themselves.66 
Next, the federal government would help fund the states. Fed-
eral financial assistance was necessary precisely because the role 
                                               
 60. See 1973 House ESA Hearing, supra note 16, at 325 (testimony of Mike Casey). 
 61.  Id. (testimony of Mike Casey). 
 62. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 146, 477; 1973 House ESA Hear-
ing, supra note 16, at 302–03 (testimony of Garrett).  
 63. ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 146. 
 64. Id.   
 65. 1973 House ESA Hearings, supra note 16, at 292 (testimony of Louis S. Clapper, 
Director of Conservation, National Wildlife Federation).  
 66. See id. at 248 (testimony of Cynthia Wilson) (explaining that it would be prefer-
able to initially have the Government have final authority over taking and on a finding that 
the State is doing an adequate job, the state should manage it); id. at 244 (testimony of Gene 
Gazlay) (acknowledging that the federal government should retain authority “[i]f a species is 
truly endangered and the State is unwilling or unable to take the necessary action to counter 
this threat”); id. at 292–93 (testimony of Louis S. Clapper, Director of Conservation, National 
Wildlife Federation) (recommending “[t]hat the State agencies be given an opportunity to pre-
pare and manage recovery plans, and retain jurisdiction over resident species.  And such au-
thority shall remain with the States until such time that the State regulatory agency declares 
its inability or willingness to fulfill the necessary obligations”).  
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of the states was so significant.67 Moreover, federal funding was 
needed because of the historic limitations on state funding for wild-
life programs.68 
The discussions culminating in the ESA in 1973 shared an-
other feature. They understood the importance of habitat protec-
tion in saving endangered species, but they expected habitat pro-
tection to be accomplished by federal acquisition of sensitive lands. 
As the committee report put it, protection of habitat was critical, 
so land acquisition was authorized.69 But the framers of the ESA 
also understood that there were practical limits on acquiring all of 
the habitat that would be needed to preserve endangered species. 
That could not be done without dismantling our own civilization.70 
The importance of habitat prompted numerous advocates to urge 
Congress to prohibit habitat destruction as part of the law’s regu-
lation of private conduct.71 But Congress declined. The inevitable 
– and I would argue, correct – conclusion is that the 1973 Congress 
did not see the ESA as regulating land use.72 
                                               
 67. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 147, 194–95; 1973 Senate ESA 
Hearings, supra note 17, at 131 (testimony of Cynthia Wilson).  
 68. See 1973 House ESA Hearings, supra note 16, at 242 (testimony of Gazlay) (ex-
plaining that state wildlife agencies had traditionally relied on license fees and excise taxes 
rather than general tax revenues, and recommending “that this legislation provide Federal 
assistance to be matched by State general fund moneys in order to carry out recovery programs 
for endangered species”).  
 69. ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 148. 
 70. Id. at 144. 
 71. 1973 House ESA Hearings, supra note 16, at 287; 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, 
supra note 17, at 86, 104, 108. 
 72. See Petersen, supra note 1, at 481–82 (concluding that “no one in Congress con-
templated that the prohibition against taking a listed species might lead to the regulation of 
land use activities on private property”).  And yet I agree that Sweet Home was correctly de-
cided.  In Sweet Home, the Court upheld a FWS regulation that included certain habitat de-
struction within the “take” of a listed species prohibited by section 9 of the ESA.  It did so in 
part because Congress amended the law in 1982 to authorize the “incidental take” of species 
as a result of habitat destruction, a provision that is nonsensical if actions affecting habitat 
were not already covered within the prohibition on “take.”  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995).  In other words, while the regulation 
may have been an improper of the 1973 version of the ESA, it was authorized by the 1982 
amendments.  Or, in Justice Scalia’s words, it was not until 1982 that Congress agreed that 
land could be “conscripted to national zoological use.”  Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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It has often been suggested that states and others were blind-
sided by the application of the ESA to the host of obscure species 
that now fill the list.73 The red knot, the black pine snake, and the 
Florida bristle fern are among the most recently listed species.74 
None of them were mentioned during the debates preceding the 
enactment of the ESA, and none of which are likely to be familiar 
to any but the most committed wildlife aficionados today.75 By con-
trast, the authors of the ESA were said to be thinking about such 
“charismatic megafauna” as the bald eagle, whooping crane, and 
grizzly bear.76 But Congress was aware that its handiwork would 
encompass less familiar species. It discussed mollusks,77 and it 
considered the plight of the Utah prairie dog.78 No one could con-
ceive what would be listed in 40 years.79 And a glance of the origi-
nal group of species listed in 1966 included the Tule white-fronted 
goose, the Texas blind salamander, and the Commanche Springs 
pupfish.80  States and others were thus on notice that the ESA 
would impose more than a prohibition on shooting grizzly bears. 
                                               
 73. See Petersen, supra note 1, at 467. 
 74. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., SPECIES LISTED DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2015 
(2015), https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp0/reports/species-listings-by-year-report?year=2015. 
 75. See id.  
 76. Petersen, supra note 1, at 479–80. 
 77. 1973 House ESA Hearings, supra note 16, at 207. 
 78. 1973 House ESA Hearings, supra note 30, at 303.  The Utah prairie dog now 
features in a challenge of the constitutionality of the application of the ESA to species that live 
in only one state and that otherwise don’t affect interstate commerce.  See People for the Eth-
ical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. U.S. Fish and Wildife Serv., 57 F.Supp.3d 1337, 1339 (D. 
Utah 2014), rev'd and remanded sub nom., People for Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners v. 
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990 (10th Cir. 2017); see generally John Copeland Nagle, 
The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174 (1998).  
 79. 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 22, at 142. 
 80. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., FIRST SPECIES LISTED AS ENDANGERED, 
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/species/faq-first-species-listed.html (last visited Apr. 15, 
2017). 
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The statute that emerged from these discussions gained over-
whelming approval. The Senate approved it 92-0,81 the House 355-
4. 82  President Nixon signed the law, which he praised as 
“provid[ing] the Federal Government with the needed authority to 
protect an irreplaceable part of our national heritage – threatened 
wildlife.”83 
2. The provisions of the ESA 
The statute that emerged from these discussions reflected the 
important role of states. Like the Clean Air Act and the Clean Wa-
ter Act before it, the ESA “assumed for the federal government the 
role of primary standard-setter and overseer of state enforce-
ment[.]”84 The role of the states appears throughout the text of the 
act. One of the ESA’s purposes is: 
encouraging the [s]tates and other interested parties, 
through [f]ederal financial assistance and a system of in-
centives, to develop and maintain conservation programs 
which meet national and international standards is a key 
to meeting the [n]ation’s international commitments and to 
better safeguarding, for the benefit of all citizens, the 
[n]ation’s heritage in fish, wildlife, and plants.85  
The statute also declares the congressional policy “that Federal 
agencies shall cooperate with [s]tate and local agencies to resolve 
water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered 
species.”86 The substantive provisions of the ESA seek to operation-
alize those policies. 
                                               
 81. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 410.  See also Petersen, supra 
note 1, at 476 (reporting the vote on the conference committee’s handiwork, and noting that 
none of the four House members who opposed the bill explained their reasons for doing so).  
 82. Id. at 483. 
 83. Id. at 487.  
 84. Coggins, supra note 32, at 320. 
 85. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 2(a)(5), 16 U.S.C.A. §1531 (West 2012).  The 
recognition that state programs are “key” to saving endangered species was a new finding that 
had not appeared in the 1966 or 1969 versions of the law.  See Coggins, supra note 32, at 321.  
 86. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 2(c)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. §1531 (West 2012).   
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Section 4 of the law contains five criteria that the FWS must 
consider when deciding whether or not a species is endangered or 
threatened.87 Four of those criteria focus on the threats to the spe-
cies.88 The other criteria examine “the inadequacy of existing regu-
latory mechanisms.”89 The extensive discussions of state wildlife 
management programs suggest that Congress expected that often 
existing state regulatory mechanisms would be adequate. A species 
would need to be listed only if they weren’t. Moreover, section 4 
specifies that listing decisions shall be made: 
after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made 
by any [s]tate or foreign nation, or any political subdivision 
of a [s]tate or foreign nation, to protect such species, 
whether by predator control, protection of habitat and food 
supply, or other conservation practices, within any area un-
der its jurisdiction.90  
Again, Congress recognized that states would be acting to protect 
wildlife habitat, in addition to prohibiting hunting or collecting 
rare animals. 
Section 6 is entitled “cooperation with states.”91 Congress ex-
pected it to be the most important provision of the act.92 Section 6 
begins with a general requirement that the federal government 
“shall cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the 
States” in implementing the ESA.93 The section then details what 
that cooperation should look like. It authorizes “management 
                                               
 87. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 4(a)(1)(D), 16 U.S.C.A. §1533 (West 2012).   
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at § 4(b)(1)(A). 
 91. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 6, 16 U.S.C.A. §1535 (West 2012). 
 92. See ESA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 359 (statement of Sen. Tunney) 
(describing section 6 as “perhaps the most important section” of the act); id. at 362 (statement 
of Sen. Stevens) (characterizing section as the major backbone of the act).  See generally KAUSH 
ARHA & BARTON H. THOMPSON JR., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM:  
EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE COMMITMENT 89–93 (Routledge 2011) 
(reviewing the legislative history of section 6).  
 93. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 6(a), 16 U.S.C.A. §1535 (West 2012). 
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agreements,” which are “agreements with any [s]tate for the ad-
ministration and management of any area established for the con-
servation of endangered species or threatened species.”94 More im-
portantly, it authorizes “cooperative agreements,” which can be 
made “with any [s]tate, which establishes and maintains an ade-
quate and active program for the conservation of endangered spe-
cies and threatened species.”95 The provision deems a state pro-
gram “adequate and active” if it satisfies five stated criteria, in-
cluding “acceptable conservation programs” for all listed species, 
authority for acquiring habitat, and “public participation in desig-
nating resident species of fish or wildlife as endangered or threat-
ened.”96 These cooperative agreements were supposed to be central 
to the recovery of species listed under the act.97 They are also the 
trigger for the provision of federal financial assistance to assist 
states in the development and implementation of their conserva-
tion and recovery programs.98 
According to the conference committee report, section 6 gave 
states “the fundamental roles with regard to resident species” for 
a limited period of time during which the state legislature could 
enact any programs that were necessary to achieve the goals of the 
law, a device that the committee hoped “will impel the states to 
develop strong programs to avoid the alternative of federal 
preemption.”99 After that period, the role of the states would de-
pend on whether they had developed approved cooperative agree-
ments. “Where cooperative agreements are in force, these will of 
course direct and control the enforcement of endangered and 
threatened species programs. Where none are then in effect, it will 
be the responsibility of the states to develop workable programs to 
                                               
 94. Id. at § 6(b). 
 95. Id. at § 6(c)(1). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Coggins, supra note 32, at 333-35. 
 98. See ESA § 6(d). 
 99. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, at 451 (1982).  
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secure cooperative agreements with the Secretary [of the Inte-
rior.]”100  
Finally, section 6 preempts certain – but not all – state laws.101 
If a state law permits that which the ESA prohibits or prohibits 
that which the ESA permits, then it is preempted.102 But the ESA 
does not preempt “any [s]tate law or regulation which is intended 
to conserve migratory, resident, or introduced fish or wildlife, or to 
permit or prohibit sale of such fish or wildlife.”103 Moreover, states 
remained free to enact more restrictive rules governing the taking 
of a listed species.104 
The next section of the ESA—section 7 – governs interagency 
cooperation within the federal government.105 The Ninth Circuit 
has described section 7 as “the heart of the ESA,” but that is not 
what appeared to Congress in 1973.106 Its only references to states 
include the requirement that the federal government consult with 
affected states before designating critical habitat,107 and the provi-
sion – added in 1978 – which requires an individual from each af-
fected state to be included on the Endangered Species Committee 
(also known as the “God Squad”) that may be invoked to decide 
                                               
100. Id.  
101. See ESA §6(f).  
102. Id.  
103. Id.   
104. See id.  But Section 6’s provisions “seemed irreconcilable at best and antagonistic 
at worse” to the extent that they offered conflicting direction.  While section 6(g)(2) applied the 
federal prohibitions in states that had an approved cooperative agreement only to the extent 
that those prohibitions has also been adopted by the state, section 6(f) preempts states laws to 
the extent they are less restrictive than the ESA. Lawrence R. Liebesman & Steven A.G. Da-
vison, Takings of Wildlife Under the Endangered Species Act After Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 5 U.BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 171 (1995).  
105. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012).  
106. W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472, 495 (9th Cir. 2010).  
107. See ESA § 7(a)(2).  
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whether or not to authorize a federal project even though it would 
jeopardize the survival of a species.108 
C. The ESA in 2017 
The ESA took on a life of its own within months after its en-
actment when David Etnier discovered the snail darter swimming 
in the Little Tennessee River in the path of the Tellico Dam.109  
Senator Howard Baker denounced the tiny fish as “the bold per-
verter of the ESA.”110 Ever since then, the ESA has revered or re-
viled, depending on one’s perspective. It has succeeded in prevent-
ing extinctions; it has failed to help many species recover.111 While 
some organizations advocate strengthening the ESA, most defend-
ers of the ESA have concentrated on playing defense. The Center 
for Biological Diversity (CBD) has documented more than 303 at-
tacks on the ESA since 1996.112 Of course, what the CBD views as 
an “attack” is a necessary reform from the perspective of those who 
are frustrated with the application of the ESA. 
The role of the states has been one of the more frequent topics 
of potential reform. Many of the issues are addressed in “The En-
dangered Species Act and Federalism: Effective Conservation 
Through Greater State Commitment,” a 2011 book edited by 
Kaush Arha and Barton Thompson, that emerged from a workshop 
on biodiversity and federalism held at Stanford University in 
2005.113 Also, the Western Governors Association (WGA) has been 
the leading advocate for a stronger state role in applying the ESA. 
                                               
108. Id. at § 7(e)(3)(g); Ben Rubin, Calling on the “God Squad,” ENDANGERED SPECIES 
L. AND POL’Y (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.endangeredspecieslawandpolicy.com/2014/04/arti-
cles/conservation/calling-on-the-god-squad/.  
109. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 158 (1978); See generally 
ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, THE SNAIL DARTER AND THE DAM: HOW PORK-BARREL POLITICS 
ENDANGERED A LITTLE FISH AND KILLED A RIVER (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).  
110. 125 CONG. REC. 23867 (1979) (statement of Sen. Baker).  
111. See John Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 203 (2009) (evaluating the success of the ESA in achieving its various purposes). 
112. Attacks on the Endangered Species Act, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/table.html (last updated Jan. 7, 
2017).  
113. See generally THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM:  EFFECTIVE 
CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE COMMITMENT (Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, 
Jr. eds., Routledge 2011).  
2017 THE ORIGINAL ROLE OF THE STATES IN THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
403 
 
Its 2016 policy resolution on “Species Conservation and the Endan-
gered Species Act” begins with a ringing endorsement of both the 
goals of the ESA and the ability of states to help achieve them: 
1. Western Governors applaud the principles and intent of 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Since its enactment in 
1973, the ESA has helped prevent the extinction and as-
sisted the recovery of some threatened and endangered spe-
cies, while providing ancillary benefits to other species. 
2. Through broad trustee, statutory and police powers, 
States have primary management authority over all fish 
and wildlife within their borders. States also exercise sov-
ereign authority over the administration of water rights 
within their borders. 
3. Western states are proactively engaged in species conser-
vation, including development of state and/or multi-state 
conservation plans to manage species at the local level as 
an alternative to federal ESA regulation. 
4. Through decades of work by staff and contractors, States 
have developed extensive science, expertise, and knowledge 
of species within their borders. 
5. Western states are particularly and uniquely affected by 
the ESA. States are the primary recipients of economic ben-
efits associated with healthy species and ecosystems. Tour-
ism and recreation in wildlife-dependent communities help 
sustain rural economies and promote healthier communi-
ties throughout the West. At the same time, species listings 
and the associated prohibitions and consultations can im-
pact western states’ abilities to promote economic develop-
ment, accommodate population growth, and maintain and 
expand infrastructure such as roads, water projects, and 
transmission lines. In these circumstances, the economic 
costs of ESA compliance can fall disproportionately on west-
ern states and local communities. 
6. Given the impact ESA listing decisions have on vital state 
interests, states should be provided the opportunity to be 
full partners in administering and implementing the ESA. 
Federal agencies should work with states in a meaningful 
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and productive manner on all ESA matters potentially im-
pacting the states, as required by Section 6(a) of the ESA: 
“In carrying out the program authorized by the Act, the Sec-
retary shall cooperate to the maximum extent practicable 
with the States.114 
The governors continue, though, with a critique of how the 
ESA has strayed from its original vision of embracing states as 
partners in wildlife management.115 “The ESA is premised on a 
strong federal-state partnership.” But they add, “[t]he role of states 
also has been limited by rigid internal federal processes, inter-
agency jurisdictional disputes, and interpretations of the provi-
sions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).”116 
The WGA has thus “call[ed] on Congress to amend and reau-
thorize” the ESA “while maintaining the Act’s integrity and origi-
nal intent to protect and recover listed species to a point where the 
protections ofthe Act are no longer necessary.”117 The WGA then 
identified seven goals to pursue in that process:  (1) clear recovery 
goals that lead to delisting; (2) increased flexibility for the FWS to 
make listing decisions; (3) an enhanced role for state govenments; 
(4) the use of sound science; (5) improved incentives and funding; 
(6) a clear definition of “forseeable future” for purposes of listing 
species affected by long-term threats such as climate change; and 
(7) treating states as full parterns in all ESA decisions. 118 
III. A RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE ESA  
There are many reasons why states should play a greater role 
under the ESA.  Cooperative federalism is the norm in federal en-
vironmental statutes, and it is conspicuous by its absence in the 
                                               
114. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N., POLICY RESOL. 2016-08, SPECIES CONSERVATION AND THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1–2 (2016), https://westgov.org/images/2016-08_Species_Conserva-
tion_and_ESA.pdf.  
115. Id. at 2.  
116. Id.  
117. Id. at 5.  
118. Id. at 5–8. 
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ESA.119  A revived state role has numerous advantages.  State en-
vironmental regulation has become quite attractive to many envi-
ronmentalists at the onset of the Trump Administration.120 The 
Western Governors Association (WGA) has prioritized reforming 
the ESA in order to better achieve the statute’s goals while better 
respecting state authorities and interests.  The theoretical justifi-
cation has been there all along. The doctrine of subsidiarity, which 
emerged from Catholic social thought and now plays a key role in 
the governance of the European Union, seeks to empower local and 
state authorities but is willing to rely on federal power if the states 
prove to be inadequate.121 This Article thus proposes to return to 
the original understanding of the state role in the ESA by: (1) fur-
ther empowering state conservation efforts to avoid ESA listings, 
(2) resurrecting the cooperative agreements that Congress ex-
pected to play a major role in the implementation of the act, and 
(3) promoting additional funding and assistance to state wildlife 
managers who are seeking to achieve the goals of the ESA. 
Several features of the ESA reveal its promise in empowering 
states to assert control over their wildlife and habitats—if they can 
show that they are sufficient to achieve the goal of preserving en-
dangered species.  First, states can engage in conservation efforts 
to prevent the need for listing a species under the ESA. Second, the 
role of cooperative ageements authorized by section 6 of the ESA 
can be revitalized.  Third, states can pursue recovery efforts that 
                                               
119. See J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act:  A Com-
parative Assessment and Call for Change, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM:  
EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE COMMITMENT  35, 36 (Kaush Arha & 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr. eds., Routledge 2011) (describing the ESA as “an oddball among fed-
eral environmental statutes” because the ESA does not reflect cooperative federalism); Robert 
L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson For Conservation From Pollution Control Law: 
Cooperative Federalism For Recovery Under The Endangered Species Act, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. 
L. 45 (2002) (calling for the ESA to embrace cooperative federalism). 
120. See, e.g., Dan Farber, How States Can Defend Themselves Against Trump, 
LEGALPLANET, Feb. 2, 2017, http://legal-planet.org/2017/02/02/how-states-can-defend-their-
own-environments/.  
121. See Jenna Bednar, Subsidiarity and Robustness: Building the Adaptive Effi-
ciency of Federal Systems, 55 Nᴏᴍᴏs 231 (2014); Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity As a Structural 
Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38 (2003); James L. Huffman, 
Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive through Decentralization: The Case for 
Subsidiarity, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1377, 1381 (2004); Hon. James L. Buckley, Reflections on Law 
and Public Life, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 391, 396 (1998). 
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result in both the conservation of the species and the lifting of the 
ESA’s regulations. 
1. Listing decisions 
States are eager to avoid ESA listings because the ESA im-
poses significant federal land use regulations to protect listed spe-
cies. According to the WGA, 
ESA listings dramatically alter the ability of states and fed-
eral agencies to seek incentive-based, collaborative solu-
tions to difficult conservation questions by causing citizens 
to avoid cooperative agreements. ESA listing decisions have 
real economic impacts for state and local governments 
through restriction on rangeland grazing, hunting, tourism 
and development of resources on public and private lands. 
The negative economic impacts of federal ESA decisions fall 
solely on states, local communities, businesses, jobs, and 
private property owners.122 
The dilemma, of course, is that the activities that are negatively 
impacted by ESA regulations are the same activities that them-
selves negatively impact rare species. 
The ESA allows states to avoid the federal regulation that the 
law imposes.123 Of the five statutory factors to be considered in de-
ciding whether a species is endangered, four require consideration 
of the actual threats to the species.124 The fifth factor—"the inade-
quacy of existing regulatory mechanisms"—examines the protec-
tion that the species already enjoys under federal, state, local, or 
foreign law.125 The premise of that factor is that a species is not 
endangered if other laws already protect it. 
State authorities have seized on this provision to develop pro-
tections for a species in order to avoid its listed under the ESA. 
                                               
122. W. Governors’ Ass’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Policy Regarding Im-
plementation of Section 4(b)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.ee-
news.net/assets/2015/08/05/document_pm_04.pdf. 
123. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2012). 
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(C), (E) (2012).  
125. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)(D) (2012). 
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Erin Ryan cites two examples: “Maine negotiated a five-year op-
portunity to experiment with state-based conservation efforts be-
fore its Atlantic salmon run was ultimately listed, and eleven mid-
western states used a negotiated reprieve from a black-tailed prai-
rie dog listing to successfully increase breeding populations while 
staving off the negative consequences of an ESA listing.”126 States 
have prepared similar conservation plans to avoid the listing of the 
Yellowstone grizzly bear population, a plant in Utah, the Colorado 
River cutthroat trout, etc.127 Most recently, the FWS has cited state 
conservation efforts to decline to list: 
 The Washington ground squirrel, which suffered as the re-
sult of agricultural development in eastern Washington 
and north-central Oregon. 128  Those states responded to 
protect the squirrel by prohibiting activities detrimental to 
the squirrel on state-owned land in Oregon, by including 
measures to conserve the squirrel when siting wind energy 
projects, and by developing a Multiple Species General 
Conservation Plan (MSGCP) in Douglas County, Washing-
ton;129 
 The relict leopard frog, endemic to three rivers and associ-
ated springs in Nevada, Arizona, and Utah.130 The laws of 
all three states protect the frog by ensuring that state wa-
ter rights determinations account for the frog’s needs, pro-
hibiting alteration of a wetland or stream to the detriment 
                                               
126. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN 294 (2011). 
127. Greater Yellowstone Coal., Inc. v. Servheen, 665 F.3d 1015, 1030–32 (9th Cir. 
2011); Colo. River Cutthroat Trout v. Salazar, 898 F. Supp. 2d 191, 200 (D.D.C. 2012); Ctr. for 
Native Ecosystems v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 795 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1200 (D. Colo. 2011).  
128. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; 12-Month Findings on Peti-
tions To List Nine Species as Endangered or Threatened Species, 81 Fed. Reg. 64,843, 64,855 
(Sept. 21, 2016). 
129. Id.   
130. See Relict Leopard Frog Conservation Team, Conservation Agreement and 
Rangewide Conseervation Assessment and Strategy for the Relict Leopard Frog (Rana Onca) 
(2005).  
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of wildlife without a permit, and prohibiting the collection, 
importation, and possession of the frog;131 and 
 The Coral Pink Sands Dunes tiger beetle, which lives only 
in the Coral Pink Sand Dunes of southern Utah, which was 
protected by extensive state conservation planning efforts 
and by the management of the Coral Pink Sand Dunes 
State Park.132 
The challenge is to determine when such state efforts are ade-
quate to prevent the endangerment of the species, as section 4 of 
the ESA requires. The controversy surrounding the dunes sage-
brush lizard is illustrative.133  The FWS declined to list the lizard 
because of the conservation measures adopted by New Mexico and 
Texas.134 The lizard lives “within the Permian Basin, which is one 
of the most productive oil and gas producing areas in the western 
United States.”135 The potential conflict between preserving the 
lizard and oil and gas development caused local members of Con-
gress to introduce legislation that would have exempted the lizard 
from the ESA.136 While Congress was debating, state officials in 
New Mexico and Texas worked to develop a variety of conservation 
initiatives.137 The FWS found that “83 percent of the dunes sage-
                                               
131. Id.; See Endangered and Threatened Wildlifeand Plants; 12-Month Findings on 
Petitions To List 10 Species as Endangered or Threatened Species, 81 Fed. Reg. 69,425 (Oct. 
6, 2016). 
132. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Pro-
posed Rule To List Coral Pink Sand Dunes Tiger Beetle and Designate Critical Habitat, 78 
Fed. Reg. 61,082 (Oct. 2, 2013). 
133. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Pro-
posed Rule to List Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 77 Fed. Reg. 36,872 (June 19, 2012). 
134. Id. at 36,899.  
135. Id. at 36,887. 
136. See 158 CONG. REC. S2,174 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2012) (statement of Sen. Corwyn) 
(amendment introduced by Sen. Corwyn to amend the ESA to “not apply to the sand dune 
lizard”); See also 157 CONG. REC. H5,557–58 (daily ed. July 26, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Pearce) (reporting that his constituents asked, “They couldn’t kill our jobs with a lizard, could 
they?”). 
137. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Withdrawal of the Proposed 
Rule to List Dunes Sagebrush Lizard, 77 Fed. Reg. at 36,884–85. 
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brush lizard's habitat was enrolled in the New Mexico Conserva-
tion Agreements,”138 while “[t]he Texas Conservation Plan focuses 
on the avoidance of activities within lizard habitat that would fur-
ther degrade habitat, reclamation of lizard habitat to reduce frag-
mentation, and, due to the presence of mesquite in Texas habitat, 
removal of mesquite that is encroaching into shinnery oak 
dunes.”139 The FWS determined that the conservation efforts “have 
a high certainty of being implemented” because:  
the level of enrollment is high . . . , the mechanism and au-
thorities for collecting funds are in place, the process for al-
locating funds to support reclamation work and research in 
lizard habitat is in place, the monitoring and documenta-
tion of compliance with the conservation measures are in 
place, and monthly and annual reports are complete, and 
all parties have the legal authorities to carry out their re-
sponsibilities under the New Mexico Conservation Agree-
ments.140 
By contrast, the FWS listed the little prairie chicken notwith-
standing an extensive effort by multiple states to develop conser-
vation programs to save the chicken without federal interven-
tion.141 The FWS acknowledged that states had adopted a variety 
of important conservation efforts have been undertaken across the 
range of the lesser prairie-chicken142 that have “slowed, but not 
halted, alteration of lesser prairie-chicken habitat.”143 But the FWS 
found that those efforts were insufficient to save the chicken be-
cause they “are limited in size or duration” or they “are voluntary, 
with little certainty that the measures, once implemented, will be 
                                               
138. Id. at 36,884.   
139. Id. at 36,885. 
140. Id. at 36,886; See also id. (finding that “the [Texas] conservation effort will be 
effective at eliminating or reducing threats to the species, because it first avoids habitat and 
if necessary, limits development within suitable and occupied habitat as a priority, and it also 
improves and strives to restore habitat and reduces fragmentation”). 
141. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing the Lesser Prairie-
Chicken as a Threatened Species, 77 Fed. Reg. 73,828, 73,836 (Dec. 11, 2012). 
142. Id. at 73,836.  
143. Id. at 73,828, 73,836. 
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maintained over the long term.”144  The lesser prairie-chicken list-
ing provoked multiple lawsuits contending that the FWS failed to 
afford sufficient credit to the state conservation efforts.145 A federal 
district court agreed with the states and the FWS responded by 
vacating the listing.146 
Perhaps the most significant feature of the legal framework is 
who gets to decide the adequacy of state regulation. The existing 
law entrusts that task to the FWS, subject to arbitrary and capri-
ciousness review in the courts.147 There are good reasons for that, 
but there is cause for concern as well. It is easy—too easy, per-
haps—for federal regulators to decide that only federal regulation 
is adequate.  
Thus, the WGA resolved that “States should be included as 
partners in ESA listing determinations, particularly in the case of 
listings that could have significant impact on state economies.”148 
The governors proposed “that state and multi-state conservation 
plans, upon review, consultation and endorsement by the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
should give rise to a regulatory presumption by federal agencies 
that an ESA listing is not warranted.” 149  Such a presumption 
would be within the FWS’s discretion to interpret the ESA, for it 
would still entrust the FWS with the decision whether or not to 
“endorse” a state conservation plan.150 But the hostility with which 
some conservation groups view state management is reflected in 
the claim that the Western governors’ “would replace science-based 
                                               
144. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Determination of Threatened 
Status for the Lesser Prairie-Chicken, 79 Fed. Reg. 19,974, 19,998 (Apr. 10, 2014).  
145. See generally Permian Basin Petroleum Ass’n Chaves County v. Dep’t of the In-
terior, 2016 WL 4411550 (D. Tex. Feb. 29, 2016).  
146. See generally Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Lesser Prairie-
Chicken Removed From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 81 Fed. Reg. 47047 
(July 20, 2016).  
147. See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012).  
148. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N., POLICY RESOL. 2014-11 2 (2014), http://westgov.org/im-
ages/stories/policies/Species_of_Concern_and_Candidate_Species_2014-.pdf. 
149. Id. at 2.  
150. See id. 
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decision making with back-room politics in determining which spe-
cies are protected and which are marked for extinction” and that 
the “resolution is a power grab [by] the Western governors to take 
over the management of endangered species, when it is the failure 
of state wildlife policies that led these species to the brink of ex-
tinction in the first place.”151 
The WGA’s proposal is contrary to the original understanding 
of the ESA, which specifically rejected calls to entrust states with 
veto power.152 But the original understanding did not say anything 
about embracing the extensive deference to the FWS that the 
courts offer today.153  One solution, therefore, would be to ask the 
courts to rule on the adequacy of state conservation measures with-
out affording deference to either the FWS or to the states.  That 
approach would run counter to the dominant, and justifiable, per-
spective that agencies are better equipped to resolve complex sci-
entific questions than generalist federal judges.  But the dilemma 
raised by the ESA in this context is that a court is being asked to 
decide which of two competing sovereigns best understands the 
same scientific evidence.  Eliminating judicial deference would 
frustrate both the FWS (who benefits from such deference now) 
and the WGA (who prefers a state veto over ESA listings). But that 
might be a better way to satisfy the competing claims regarding 
the statute’s query regarding the adequacy of existing conservation 
measures. 
Regardless of who gets to evaluate the scientific data, the 
WGA also complains that the FWS often errs in gathering the rel-
evant information. The WGA seeks to “[i]ncrease the regulatory 
flexibility of the Services to review and make decisions on petitions 
to list or change the listing status of a species under the ESA,”154 to 
                                               
151. Phil Taylor, Western Govs Seek Deference, Funding From Feds To Avert Listings, 
E&E NEWS (June 11, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/stories/1060001149/print 
(quoting Erik Molvar of WildEarth Guardians).  
152. See id.  
153. See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016) (apply-
ing the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to uphold a FWS listing decision).  
154. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOL. 2016-08 6 (June 14, 2016),  https://west-
gov.org/images/2016-08_Species_Conservation_and_ESA.pdf. The WGA elaborates:   
The current statutory time frames provided for making listing determina-
tions are not sufficient to allow for adequate data collection and analysis. 
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“[e]nsure the use of sound science in ESA decisions,155 and to define 
the term “foreseeable future,” especially as it relates to species af-
fected by climate change.156 And the WGA advances a more specific 
complaint about the FWS’s listing decisions. The governors believe 
that the FWS discounts the scientific expertise of the states. As 
discussed above, Congress believed that the states possessed 
greater scientific expertise at the time when the ESA was 
                                               
Consequently, instead of prioritizing listing decisions based upon resource 
availability and for the species needing the most immediate attention, the 
agencies are often forced to prioritize listing determinations through legal 
action. This can result in making determinations based on insufficient 
data for a species. Further, it can jeopardize opportunities to partner with 
states, landowners and other stakeholders for preemptive species conser-
vation efforts that could eliminate any need to list the species. 
 Id.  
155. Id. at 6. As the WGA explains,  
Given the broad implications that may arise when ESA actions are taken, 
significant decisions must be made using objective, peer-reviewed scien-
tific literature and scientific observations. A review of the scientific and 
management provisions contained within listing, recovery and de-listing 
decisions by acknowledged independent experts is important to ensure the 
public that decisions are well-reasoned and scientifically based. State 
agencies often have the best available science, expertise and other scien-
tific and institutional resources such as mapping capabilities, biological 
inventories, biological management goals, state wildlife action plans and 
other important data. This wealth of resources is highly valuable; the fed-
eral government should recognize, consult, and employ these vast re-
sources in developing endangered species listing, recovery and delisting 
decisions. Scientific and management review committees, as well as the 
scope and extent of the appropriate scientific and management review, 
should be agreed upon by the Services and the affected states. Federal 
agencies may delegate their responsibility to name these review commit-
tees, and determine the scope of review to states in order to enhance state 
ownership of the committee’s decision. 
  Id.  
156. Id.  Here the WGA asserts that “[t]he meaning of “foreseeable future” with the 
use of climate modeling needs to be defined for listing decisions where climate change is critical 
to the decision.” Id. 
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crafted.157 Indeed, FWS continues to acknowledge that.158 As long-
time ESA expert and Obama Administration official Michael Bean 
told Congress, 
we strongly agree that States, the data from States, is often 
the best available data for us. Because of the extensive ex-
perience and responsibilities of the States, the ESA already 
directs the Service to carefully consider the information 
that States provide. The Service must take into account the 
work of the States in its listing decisions. And the Service 
must provide the States with a written explanation when-
ever it makes a listing decision at odds with the recommen-
dations of a State.159 
But Bean added that state expertise does not always encom-
pass the full scope of the ESA.160 Given that “not all States have 
responsibilities or programs for all the types of species eligible for 
ESA listing: in particular, plants and invertebrates,” the best 
available data for such species “may come from universities, muse-
ums, conservation organizations, and industry.”161  Moreover, as 
Bean explained, “For counties and tribes, the situation is more var-
ied. In most States, the jurisdiction and responsibility for wildlife 
rests with the State, not with the counties, which generally have 
no research programs related to ESA listing decisions.”162 Bean 
thus concluded 
the question of what constitutes the best available data 
should turn on an evaluation of the data itself, and not who 
provided it. To presume at the outset that the data from a 
                                               
157. See W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOL. 2016-08 (June 14, 2016),  https://west-
gov.org/images/2016-08_Species_Conservation_and_ESA.pdf. 
158. See Legislative Hearing on the Endangered Species Act: Hearing on H.R. 4315, 
H.R. 4316, H.R. 4317, and H.R. 4318 Before the H. Nat. Res. Comm., 113th Cong. (2014) (state-
ment of Michael Bean, Counselor to the Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, U.S. 




162. Id. at 21. 
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particular source will always constitute the best available 
data would negate the very purpose of requiring the use of 
the best available data. Moreover, it is clear that data from 
States, counties, and tribes cannot all constitute the best 
available data when the data from these sources are in con-
flict, as they sometimes are.163 
Finally, the ESA directs the FWS to notify relevant state agen-
cies of any proposed listing of species or designation of critical hab-
itat, and it further directs the FWS to provide the state with “a 
written justification for [the] failure to adopt regulations con-
sistent with the agency’s comments.”164 The State of Alaska relied 
on his provision in challenging the designation of critical habitat 
for the polar bear.165 The Ninth Circuit recently held that the FWS 
complied with that requirement in the polar bear case, but the 
court’s holding that such claims are judicially reviewable suggests 
that more states may act to ensure that the FWS supplies the req-
uisite response to the state’s concerns. 166 
2. Section 6 cooperative agreements 
“When Congress enacted the modern ESA in 1973,” Rob Fisch-
man explains, “it envisioned that state programs would play a key 
role in the Act’s recovery program.”167 That is why it is surprising 
that section 6 of the ESA “has languished at the periphery of ESA 
implementation.”168 Fischman describes section 6 as “the center-
piece of the ESA’s longstanding but minor program of cooperative 
federalism.”169 
                                               
163. Bean identified a further problem.  “Frequently the publications, studies, and 
reports on which the Service relies are based upon underlying data collected and maintained 
by the States, who control access to it. State law sometimes stringently restricts the release of 
certain wildlife data, as does the State of Texas, for example.”  Id. 
164. Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 2(i), 16 U.S.C. §1531 (2012). 
165. Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 549 (9th Cir. 2016). 
166. See id. at 565.  
167. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 179, 211 (2005). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
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The original understanding of the ESA anticipated something 
much different.  Robert Davison has written the most thorough de-
scription of what Congress intended section 6 to accomplish and 
what section 6 has actually done instead.170  Section 6 was designed 
to reconcile the need for a coherent national policy and the recog-
nition "that the states are far better equipped to handle the prob-
lems of day-to-day enforcement than the federal government."171  
But two subsections of section 6—(f) and (g)—“seemed irreconcila-
ble at best and antagonistic at worst.”172  Subsection (f), entitled 
“conflicts between federal and state laws,” voids any state law 
which permits what is prohibited by ESA or prohibits what is au-
thorized by the ESA.173 Moreover, subsection (f) says that state law 
may be more restrictive than the ESA itself or FWS regulations, 
but state law may not be less restrictive.174  Subsection (g), entitled 
“transition,” states, “[t]he prohibitions set forth in or authorized 
pursuant to sections 1533(d) and 1538(a)(1)(B) of this title shall not 
apply with respect to the taking of any resident endangered species 
or threatened species . . . within any State . . . which is then a party 
to a cooperative agreement with the Secretary pursuant to subsec-
tion (c) of this section (except to the extent that the taking of any 
such species is contrary to the law of such State).”175   
Here is the issue:  Subsection (g) suggests that the ESA’s take 
prohibition does not apply to a state that is party to a cooperative 
agreement with the FWS, but subsection (f) seems to preempt state 
laws that are less restrictive than the ESA or FWS regulations.176  
                                               
170. See generally Robert P. Davison,The Evolution of Federalism under Section 6 of 
the Endangered Species Act, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM: EFFECTIVE 
CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE COMMITMENT 89 (Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thomp-
son, Jr. eds., Routledge 2011) [hereinafter Davison]. 
171. Id. at 93.  
172. Id. 
173. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (2012).  
174. Id.  
175. Id. § 1535(g)(2). Section 1538 contains the ESA’s prohibition on the “take” of en-
dangered species; section 1533(d) allows the FWS to extend the take prohibition to threatened 
species. See id. §§ 1538, 1533(d).  
176. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535 (2012). 
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The rationale for subsection (g)’s approach is that the ESA “ap-
peared to contemplate cooperative agreements as a mechanism to 
assist in the development and implementation of state programs 
to conserve species."177 States would be allowed to employ their own 
techniques for conserving listed species, even if those techniques 
were different from those adopted by the federal government.178 
Specifically, actions that are deemed a prohibited “take” by the 
FWS implementing the ESA could nonetheless be permitted if a 
state had demonstrated another way of protecting the species as 
part of reaching a cooperative agreement approved by the FWS.179 
That understanding of the law vanished quickly. The regula-
tion that the FWS promulgated in 1976 afforded subsection 
1535(g)(2) "a very narrow interpretation" even though that provi-
sion "had been the subject of much debate and interest in Congress 
two [sic] years earlier.”180  Then, in 1992, the only federal district 
court to address the issue brushed aside the claim that the FWS 
take regluations did not apply in a state that was party to a coop-
erative agreement.181  In Swan View v. Turner, the forestry indus-
try argued habitat destruction did not constitute a prohibited 
“take” because Montana law did not prohibit habitat destruction, 
and Montana was party to a cooperative agreement with FWS.182  
The court was almost persuaded, but not quite.183  It acknowledged 
that the forestry industry “raises compelling arguments on this is-
sue,” but it instead ruled that  
based on the clear language of § 6(f) of the ESA combined 
with the overwhelming priority Congress has given to the 
preservation of threatened and endangered species, the 
court must conclude that the less restrictive takings provi-
sions under Montana law are preempted by the ESA and 
that the definition of “take” under the ESA which includes 
                                               
177. Davison, supra note 170, at 94. 
178. Id.  
179. Id.  
180. Id. 
181. See Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992). 
182. Id.  
183. Id.  
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“harm” and “significant habitat modification” is controlling 
in this case.184 
The Swan View court's holding means "that section 6(f) of the 
ESA nullifies any exemption from the Act's takings prohibitions 
provided under section 6(g)(2)(A) or section 4(d).”185 Perhaps most 
surprisingly, no other court has grappled with the priority seeming 
afforded to cooperative agreements by subsection 6(g). 
Section 6 also authorizes federal funding for state conserva-
tion programs.186 The FWS provided $32 million in such funding in 
2013, including, money “to acquire and restore 184 acres of habitat 
for the reintroduction of the endangered Salt Creek tiger beetle,” a 
“highly-imperiled species” that lives in eastern saline wetlands, 
which are the “most limited and endangered wetland type and veg-
etation community in all of Nebraska.”187 
That’s not enough for the WGA. It asserts that “[i]ncentives 
and funding for conservation are essential.”188 More specifically, 
the WGA has thus called for 
 Increasing grants authorized under ESA Section 6 – and 
other federal funding for the recovery of listed species – for: 
1) state and local implementation of the Act; and 2) federal 
efforts to prevent additional listings in active partnership 
with the states; 
 Improving the functionality of ESA Section 6 to increase 
partnerships and cooperation between states and the fed-
eral government in addressing ESA issues; and 
                                               
184. Id. at 938.  
185. Davison, supra note170, at 103.  
186. See Endangered Species Act, supra note 164, § 6. 
187. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Boosts State Endan-
gered Species Conservation Efforts with $32 Million in Grants, FWS.ORG (July 9, 2013), 
https://www.fws.gov/mountain-prairie/pressrel/2013/07092013grantAnnouncement.php. 
188. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOL. 2016-08 7 (June 14, 2016), https://west-
gov.org/images/2016-08_Species_Conservation_and_ESA.pdf. 
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 Alleviating the pressure on states to expend scarce funds 
to address, mitigate and recover endangered and threat-
ened species, at the expense of non-listed species within 
the state’s jurisdiction;189 
The FWS and conservation organizations would concur with these 
recommendations, but the more general limitiations on the federal 
budget make it unlikely that they will be satisfied soon. 
In sum, section 6 has come to be understood as a funding pro-
vision.  It is likely that Congress intended for it to be more than 
that.  It is strange to think that Congress spent so much time em-
phasizing the role of the states, but then neglected to codify that 
role in the act.190  Perhaps the most important task in recovering 
the original understanding of the ESA is to restore cooperative 
agreements to the role that they were intended to occupy. 
3. Recovery & delisting 
States can employ conservation programs to delist a species 
that has recovered.191 The same factors that determine whether a 
species should be listed are also used to determine whether the 
species should be delisted because it is no longer endangered or 
threatened.192 Thus, even if a state fails to prevent a listing in the 
first instance, its conservation efforts can result in an early re-
moval of the species from the list of federally protected species.193 
The WGA, along with numerous writers and advocates, has 
criticized the failure of the ESA to adequately involve the states in 
recovery efforts.194 “The Endangered Species Act can effectively be 
                                               
189. Id. at 3. 
190. See Davison, supra note 170, at 95 (asserting that "[w]hatever role was envi-
sioned for the states by the Congress in the 1973 ESA, it appears to have been of a greater 
magnitude than the one that resulted”).  
191. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of the Mag-
azine Mountain Shagreen From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 78 Fed. Reg. 
28513 (May 15, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
192. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2012). 
193. See id.  
194. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOL. 2016-08 6 (June 14, 2016), https://west-
gov.org/images/2016-08_Species_Conservation_and_ESA.pdf. 
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implemented only through a full partnership between the states, 
federal government, local governments and private landowners,” 
according to the WGA.195 
One way to accomplish this partnership is to authorize the 
delegation of authority for the development of conservation 
plans on a voluntary basis to states that choose to accept 
such delegation, and agree with the appropriate Secretary 
to perform them in accordance with specified standards. 
Authority should also be given to the appropriate Secretary 
to provide grants for the additional administrative costs to 
the state. States will benefit by a right of refusal to be part-
ners in recovery planning and species management. Addi-
tionally, states should also be offered tools such as inci-
dental take authority, as authorized by the ESA.196 
Moreover, the WGA calls for “[p]roviding greater distinction 
between the management of threatened versus endangered species 
in ESA to allow for greater management flexibility, including in-
creased state authority for species listed as threatened,” and 
“[p]roviding more extensive state engagement in development and 
implementation of Section 4(d) special rules or other mechanisms 
under the ESA that promote species conservation while addressing 
situations that merit flexibility or creative approaches.”197 Each of 
these steps will serve to “[e]nhance the role of state governments 
in recovering species.”198 
The WGA would like the ESA to “[r]equire clear recovery goals 
for listed species, and actively pursue delisting of recovered spe-
cies.”199 As they explain, 
recovery, and ultimately de-listing of species covered by the 
ESA, should be the highest priority of the Act. Every effort 
should be made to complete a recovery plan within one year 
                                               
195. Id.   
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 3.  
198. Id. at 6.  
199. Id. at 5. 
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of a species being listed, when doing so will not compromise 
the integrity of the plan. For climate change listings a two 
to three year process may be reasonable. Federal funding 
for ESA activities should be prioritized to achieve species 
recovery.200 
They further contend 
that the best way to accomplish this goal is to require the 
Services to publish clear and quantifiable recovery goals, in 
consultation with the individual affected state(s), for 
threatened or endangered species at the time of the listing 
decision. This will provide objective recovery criteria that 
both state and federal agencies may work toward in the re-
covery process. Recovery plans should also provide guid-
ance, in the case of species listed as endangered,  re-
garding the criteria for a down-listing from endangered to 
threatened. In cases where quantification of recovery goals 
is not initially feasible, the services should be required to 
publish a plan, including a timeline, describing the steps 
the federal agencies will take in identifying measurable 
goals. Recovery goals should be reviewed and changed using 
an adaptive framework. Further, the Western Governors 
believe the required objective recovery criteria should in-
clude a clear articulation of the required population, popu-
lation trends, or other relevant criteria, including ameliora-
tion of threats identified in the listing process.201 
A review of the species that have recently recovered to the 
point that they were delisted shows that states are often more in-
volved than usually believed. States were involved in conserving 
each of the species that were delisted in 2015 and 2016.202 The FWS 
                                               
200. W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOL. 2016-08 5 (June 14, 2016), https://west-
gov.org/images/2016-08_Species_Conservation_and_ESA.pdf.  
201. Id. at 5–6. 
202. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the San Mi-
guel Island Fox, Santa Rosa Island Fox, and Santa Cruz Island Fox From the Federal List of 
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, and Reclassifying the Santa Catalina Island Fox From 
Endangered to Threatened, 81 Fed. Reg. 53315-01 (Aug. 12, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. 
pt. 17); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the Island Night Lizard 
From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 79 Fed. Reg. 18190-01 (Apr. 1, 
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delisted the Louisiana black bear in part because they “are cur-
rently, and will continue to be, protected from taking, possession, 
and trade by State laws throughout their historical range.”203 The 
FWS delisted the Delmarva fox squirrel in 2015 thanks in part to 
the efforts of the State of Maryland.204 Likewise, the efforts of Cal-
ifornia and Oregon helped the delisting of the Modoc sucker.205 In 
California, “the California Fish and Game Code affords some pro-
tection to stream habitats for all perennial, intermittent, and 
ephemeral rivers and streams” by minimizing impacts.206 
Yet even with federal assistance, states often miss the oppor-
tunity to take a more proactive role in achieving the recovery of 
listed species.207 The 1989 listing of a snail stymied Arkansas’s 
plans to develop a state park and lodge, yet the state did not even 
bother to comment when the FWS proposed to delist the snail in 
                                               
2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The only exceptions were those species that are found 
only on federal lands.  See id. (delisting the island night lizard, which “is endemic to three 
federally owned Channel Islands (San Clemente, San Nicolas, and Santa Barbara) located off 
the southern California coast and a small islet (Sutil Island) located just southwest of Santa 
Barbara Island.”); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the San Miguel 
Island Fox, Santa Rosa Island Fox, and Santa Cruz Island Fox From the Federal List of En-
dangered and Threatened Wildlife, and Reclassifying the Santa Catalina Island Fox From En-
dangered to Threatened, 81 Fed. Reg. 53315-01 (delisting the island fox, which “inhabit[s] the 
six largest of the eight Channel Islands . . . [,]” all of which are part of Channel Islands National 
Park).  
203.      Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of the Louisiana Black 
Bear From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Removal of Similar-
ity-of-Appearance Protections for the American Black Bear, 81 Fed. Reg. 13124-01 (Mar. 11, 
2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).  
204. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of the Delmarva 
Peninsula Fox Squirrel From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 80 Fed. Reg. 
70700-01 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).  
205. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of the Modoc 
Sucker From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 80 Fed. Reg. 76235-01 
(Dec. 8, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
206. Id.  
207. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of the Mag-
azine Mountain Shagreen From the List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 78 Fed. Reg. 
28513-01 (May 15, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).   
422 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 53 
 
2013.208 Additional state authority would be consistent with the 
original understanding of the ESA and could help species recover, 
but there is no guarantee that all states will act. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Senator Baker was wrong. The snail darter was not “the bold 
perverter” of the ESA.209 Rather, the ESA worked exactly as it was 
supposed to do when it blocked the Tellico Dam that would have 
jeopardized the survival of the snail darter.210   
Moreover, the ESA has been a success. It has prevented the 
extinction of the species that it protects.211 Indeed, it does not ap-
pear that any species has gone extinct once it gained the protec-
tions of the law. 212   That is a remarkable record of statutory 
achievement.213 
                                               
208. Id.    
209. 125 Cong. Rec. 23867 (1979) (statement of Sen. Baker). 
210. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 154 (1978). 
211. See John Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness of Biodiversity Law, 24 J. LAND USE 
& ENVTL. L. 203 (2009) (evaluating the success of the ESA in achieving its various purposes). 
212. The only species that have been delisted as extinct were probably already extinct 
when the ESA was passed in 1973. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Species; Final Rule 
to Remove the Caribbean Monk Seal From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife, 73 Fed. Reg. 63901-02 (Oct. 28, 2008) (delisting the Caribean monk seal, which was 
last seen in 1952); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removal of EpioMasma 
(= Dysnomia) sampsoni, Sampson’s Pearly Mussel, from the List of Endangered and Threat-
ened Wildlife. 49 Fed. Reg. 1057-01 (Jan. 9, 1984) (delisting a mussel what had not “been col-
lected in over 50 years despite repeated sampling within its range”). The only exceptions are 
the dusky seaside sparrow, which perished in 1987, see Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 
and Plants; Final Rule to Deltat the Dusky Seaside Sparrow and Remove Its Crttlcal Habitat 
Designation, 55 Fed. Reg. 51112-01 (Dec. 12, 1990); Also the Mariana mallard and the Guam 
broadbill, whose last confirmed sightings were in 1979 and 1984, respectively. See Endangered 
and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Removing the Mariana Mallard and the Guam Broadbill 
From the Federal List of Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 69 Fed. Reg. 8116-01 (Feb. 23, 
2004). But populations of each of those three birds were already so depleted by the time the 
ESA became law that there probably wasn’t anything that the law could have done to protect 
them. 
213. For my defense of the ESA along these lines, see John Copeland Nagle, The In-
imitable Endangered Species Act, at the New York Botanical Garden’s Conference: Threshold: 
Biodiversity, Climate, and Humanity at a Crossroads (Mar. 27, 2017) (video available at 
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=AGiuZmbPjMc at 1:09). 
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But the ESA is not perfect, and its imperfections are best seen 
in two circumstances. The ESA has done a poor job of enabling spe-
cies to recover so that that are no longer in danger of extinction.  
And the implementation of the ESA has failed to produce the fed-
eral-state partnership anticipated by the framers of the law. Those 
two phenomena are related. Without the central role of the states, 
federal actions to achieve recovery have been woefully inadequate. 
The solution I propose here is to empower states by recovering 
the original purpose of the ESA. States are already becoming more 
involved in fashioning conservation plans to avoid the need for list-
ing a species. They are also moving, albeit more slowly, toward par-
ticipation in recovery efforts aimed at delisting species. The re-
maining challenge is to restore cooperative agreements to the more 
prominent role that Congress intended them to serve. 
All of this is designed to achieve the ESA’s overriding goals of 
preventing extinction and achieving recovery. The Congress that 
enacted the ESA expected the states to play a central role in that 
task.214  The restoration of that understanding of the law is what 
many states request. But if states are unwilling to engage in the 
difficult work that species conservation requires, the federal gov-
ernment will remain the backstop. The ESA represents a national 
commitment to preserve species “whatever the cost.”215  It is up to 
the states to decide whether they want to bear that cost. 
                                               
214. See 1973 Senate ESA Hearings, supra note 17 at 53 (testimony of Douglas P. 
Wheeler, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Fish, Wildlife, and Parks). 
215. Tennesee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 154 (1978).  
